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INTRODUCTION 
n the Doha trade negotiations round (“Doha Round”) at the Fifth 
Session of the Ministerial Conference in Cancún (“Cancún Ses-
sion”),1 the “Singapore Issues”2 were at the heart of the debate between 
developed and developing countries, revealing deep differences over the 
role of investment issues in trade negotiations and trade agreements. 
Hence, the Cancún Session intensified skepticism about the feasibility of 
achieving any compromise whatsoever in the near future.3 In fact, it was 
only several years ago that the countries of the Organisation for Econom-
ic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)4 failed to agree on the ap-
propriate content of a multilateral agreement on investment (“MAI”).5 
While the Doha Ministerial Declaration explicitly included the rela-
tionship between trade and investment in its agenda,6 reflecting optimism 
for a potential compromise in North-South economic disputes, the deci-
sion adopted by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) General Coun-
cil on August 1, 2004 states that “investment issues will not form part of 
                                                                                                             
 1. The Fifth Session of the Doha Round took place in Cancún, Mexico, between 
September 10 and 14, 2003. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Statement of 14 
September 2003, WT/MIN(03)/20, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
minist_e/min03_e/min03_20_e.doc. 
 2. The so-called “Singapore Issues” in the Doha Ministerial Declaration are trade 
and investment; interaction between trade and competition policy; transparency in gov-
ernment procurement; and trade facilitation. See World Trade Organization—Cancún 
Fifth Ministerial Conference, Summary of 14 September 2003, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). See 
also World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, ¶¶ 20–27, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist 
_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration]. This Article will 
focus mainly on the relationship between trade and investment in the Doha negotiations. 
 3. See AARON COSBEY ET AL., INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 25 
(2004), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_invest_and_sd.pdf. 
 4. The OECD was founded in 1961 “to help its member countries to achieve sus-
tainable economic growth and employment and to raise the standard of living in member 
countries while maintaining financial stability—all this in order to contribute to the de-
velopment of the world economy.” OECD, About OECD—History, http://www.oecd. 
org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761863_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
 5. On the failure of OECD negotiations on an MAI, see, for example, DAVID 
HENDERSON, THE MAI AFFAIR: A STORY AND ITS LESSONS 20–32 (1999); Peter T. Much-
linski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?, 34 
INT’L LAW. 1033, 1037–48 (2000); S. Zia-Zarifi, The Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment: Special Report, 9 Y.B. INT’L. ENV. L. 345 (1999). See also CHEN HUIPING, OECD’S 
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE (2002) (discussing 
the various elements of the MAI draft). 
 6. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, ¶¶ 20–22. 
I 
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the Work Programme set out in that Declaration and therefore no work 
towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the 
WTO during the Doha Round.”7 This political and diplomatic concession 
was necessary to bring the developed, developing, and emerging econo-
mies back to the trade negotiation table.8 This moment was a turning 
point that enhanced hope for better diplomatic prospects. 
We must therefore confront this question: what could serve as an alter-
native forum to the WTO for international investment regulation? A 
number of potential forums were found inappropriate for purposes of an 
MAI, and these are discussed at some length in Part I of this Article.9 
The recent failure of the Cancún Session has forced the international 
community to deal with investment regulation on unilateral, bilateral, 
and regional dimensions. This raises afresh the question whether bilateral 
and regional forums are, in fact, suitable for international investment 
regulation. Although many scholars have creatively theorized ways of 
integrating investment regulation into a future multilateral framework,10 
an exploration of the legal and political environment needed for such 
integration is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, this Article will 
focus on recent trends in the bilateral sphere. 
As a result of the failure of multilateral negotiations, the number of bi-
lateral investment treaties (“BITs”), free trade agreements (“FTAs”), and 
regional trade agreements that include investment provisions has in-
creased dramatically.11 Through their inclusion of most-favored-nation 
(“MFN”) clauses,12 these agreements form a complex network that re-
sembles a de facto multilateral agreement. Thanks to the MFN mechan-
ism, developing countries are now able to sign such agreements with in-
                                                                                                             
 7. General Council, Doha Work Programme, WT/L/579 (Aug. 1, 2004). 
 8. G8 RESEARCH GROUP, UNIV. OF TORONTO, SEA ISLAND FINAL COMPLIANCE 
RESULTS: FINAL REPORT 56 (2005), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/ 
2004seaisland_final/2004_seaisland_final.pdf. 
 9. Several attempts to regulate international investment on the multilateral level 
have failed. For a detailed discussion of these attempts in the International Trade Organi-
zation, OECD, and WTO, as well as a discussion of a potential World Investment Organ-
ization, see Jurgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 713 (2002). 
 10. See, e.g., id. at 779–88. 
 11. The number of BITs today exceeds 2200. See U.N. Conf. on Trade &  
Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services, 221–31, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2004 (2004) [hereinafter World Investment Report 2004]; 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and 
International Perspectives, 21, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003 (2003) [hereinafter 
World Investment Report 2003]. 
 12. For an example of an MFN clause, see infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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ternational consent, something that cannot currently be achieved through 
participation in the multilateral negotiation regime.13 Part II of this Ar-
ticle will examine this de facto multilateralism14 based on the content of 
BITs, the BIT signing mechanism, and the case law that has arisen from 
bilateral and regional agreements. 
Furthermore, the new era of bilateralism brings formidable challenges 
for shaping economic relationships between international investors and 
developing countries, as the latter seek foreign investments that support 
sustainable development values.15 In Part III, this Article will examine if 
and how the new BITs should strike a balance between investment pro-
tection for multinational corporations (“MNCs”) and the enforcement of 
corporate responsibility. I will assess how to advance these two objec-
tives, addressing the ways that human rights and labor provisions coun-
terbalance a broad protection of corporate investment. This issue is high-
ly sensitive; it has played a key role in developing countries’ decisions to 
reject investment agreements.16 It should be noted that the unprecedented 
power of MNCs in the multilateral arena may be mitigated at the bilateral 
level as a “humanized,” de facto MAI is developed.17 This Article con-
cludes by analyzing various models for integrating corporate responsibil-
ity safeguards into BITs. 
I. BILATERALISM: THE FORCE AGAINST MULTILATERALISM 
Given its undeniable importance, foreign direct investment (“FDI”)18 
would seem worthy of regulation by an international organization com-
parable to the WTO, which regulates international trade in goods.19 In-
                                                                                                             
 13. See Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase 
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567 (2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=616242. 
 14. The concept of de facto multilateralism presented in this Article refers to a multi-
lateral practice resulting from the combined effect of bilateral relations in the absence of 
an express multilateral agreement and not necessarily out of a sense of legal obligation. 
 15. See generally LUKE ERIC PETERSON, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING (2004); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberaliza-
tion and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 514–25 (1998). 
 16. See Muchlinski, supra note 5, at 1046, 1048 (referring to disagreements over 
labor and environmental standards as “deal breakers” contributing to the failure of the 
MAI). 
 17. For a discussion of the potential for a “humanized” de facto MAI, see infra notes 
320–24 and accompanying text. 
 18. See World Investment Report 2003, supra note 11, at 3–5. 
 19. The WTO is an international organization that supervises and liberalizes interna-
tional trade through multilateral negotiations among its members. It was created on Janu-
ary 1, 1995 and replaced the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (“GATT”), which 
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deed, some scholars have called for the establishment of just such an in-
stitution.20 However, host-investor agreements, a variety of national 
laws, and a range of international and regional regimes presently govern 
FDI.21 All of these regulatory structures create a competitive environ-
ment among States where FDI plays a crucial role.22 Moreover, such 
competition has been intensified by States’ concession of some of their 
domestic legislative power on account of trade blocks, multilateral 
agreements, and the mobility of capital.23 In light of the existing tensions 
among adverse regulatory powers, particularly between multilateral insti-
tutions and bilateral instruments in investment regulation, the role of 
BITs is essential.24 
Globalization, specifically the constant growth in FDI inflows and out-
flows that began in the 1960s and gained momentum in the 1990s, has 
created a need for legal mechanisms that promote and protect foreign 
investment.25 While treaties have been developed to regulate areas of 
international economic law such as trade,26 evidently, no legal frame-
work has addressed international investment regulation per se. There are 
several reasons for this phenomenon. First, most international economic 
activity has traditionally operated through trade rather than through in-
vestment, a state of affairs that existing legal instruments have perpe-
tuated.27 However, recent developments (i.e., the increasingly pervasive 
                                                                                                             
had served as a de facto international trade organization since 1948. See WORLD TRADE 
ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO (2007), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/what 
is_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
 20. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterpris-
es: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 5 (2003); Muchlinski, supra note 5, at 1050. 
 21. For an overview of the different levels of investment regulation, see Alfred Es-
cher, Current Developments, Legal Challenges and Definition of FDI, in LEGAL ASPECTS 
OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 1, 3–8 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999). 
 22. See generally THEODORE H. MORAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOP-
MENT (1998). 
 23. See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 469, 499 (2000) (discussing the restrictive effect of the 
current legal regime on the ability to regulate economic activity in the host State). 
 24. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 128 (2003). 
 25. For background on investment regulation on the bilateral level, see RUDOLF 
DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995). See also 
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 
(1998). 
 26. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Legal Texts—A Summary of the Uruguay 
Round, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#General (last visited Jan. 
15, 2009). 
 27. See ROBERT HOWSE, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 335–37 (1999). 
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role of FDI) have departed from the status quo.28 Second, economic, po-
litical, and cultural barriers have impeded an appreciable number of mar-
kets from opening up to foreign investment, especially when such in-
vestment would have involved intervening in domestic firms’ decision-
making.29 Countries at various stages of economic development have 
been compelled to protect local economies, the domestic manufacturing 
sector, and employees from the risks of foreign investments.30 In addi-
tion, countries have taken defensive measures to protect their national 
currencies.31 Finally, with respect to investment promotion and protec-
tion, and dispute settlement issues, developed and developing countries 
have been guided by divergent underlying values and were consequently 
unable to develop legal tools based on mutual understanding.32 
Over the past three decades, this picture has changed, primarily during 
the 1990s, when foreign investment became a central aspect of the global 
economy and effectively the principal engine of sustainable growth and 
development.33 Eventually, developing countries enacted broad policy 
changes, deregulating local industries and opening up these emerging 
markets to foreign investors.34 Previous protective measures, such as per-
formance requirements and limitations on transfers of currency, became 
less common.35 Perhaps most importantly, developed and developing 
countries began espousing similar values regarding core investment-
related issues. An illustrative example of this confluence is the achieve-
                                                                                                             
 28. See Escher, supra note 21, at 3. 
 29. For a detailed discussion of the relationships between such protection, and trade 
and development, see THEODORE MORAN, THE IMPACT OF TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT 
MEASURES ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
(1991). 
 30. See id. 
 31. For example, some of these measures impose restrictions on the transfer of in-
vestments’ principal funds and returns, and force conditions on the conversion of foreign 
exchange. See Duncan E. Williams, Note, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Con-
trols in Emerging Market Nations: Lessons From the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look 
at the International Legal Regime, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 561, 570–90 (2001). 
 32. See Kurtz, supra note 9, at 718–23. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Host countries employ such measures to increase the local benefits of the foreign 
investment in the host State, but their economic impact is questionable. However, the 
Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement prohibits such measures when they are 
inconsistent with GATT provisions requiring national treatment and the elimination of 
quantitative restriction provisions. Many Canadian and U.S. BITs also prohibit the for-
merly-common local content requirement. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., 
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, EXTRACTIVE IN-
DUSTRIES AND DEVELOPMENT at 168, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.D.9 (2007). 
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ment of a global consensus under customary international law on the 
formula used to determine compensation for expropriation.36 
While it was too early for multilateral negotiations at the time, invest-
ment exporter countries, widely known as “home countries,” found it 
necessary to protect investors’ rights with BITs. “Host countries” were 
generally regarded as open but unsafe environments for investment.37 
Home countries were concerned about potential prejudicial practices, 
such as arbitrary “access to markets,” discrimination among different 
investors, expropriation of assets, and devaluation of investment values 
due to regulatory changes.38 In contrast, host countries considered BITs a 
necessary tool to attract foreign investors, a tool that would send posi-
tive, reassuring signals to the markets.39 
These concurrent considerations triggered negotiation between home 
and host countries with common economic interests, which led to the 
signing of BITs as part of their foreign economic policies.40 Whereas in 
theory BITs are reciprocal, they turned out to be rather single-sided. 
First, BITs are typically agreements between developed and developing 
countries, and the developed country usually initiates the negotiations.41 
The economic disparity between the parties creates for the less developed 
country a stronger interest in signing such an agreement.42 Second, the 
developed country imposes the terms of the BIT on the developing coun-
try, usually in the form of a pre-structured draft known as a “model 
                                                                                                             
 36. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 397–403 (2002) 
(discussing the Hull Rule in international economic law, which provides “prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation” in case of expropriation). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Vandevelde, supra note 23, at 488–91. 
 39. But see Neumayer & Spess, supra note 13; Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bila-
teral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit . . . and They 
Could Bite (World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 3121, 2003), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_03091
104060047/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. 
 40. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, F.R.G.-Bangl., May 6, 1981, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/ 
investment_bangladesh_germany.pdf; Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Encou-
ragement and Protection of Investment, Malta-Fr., Aug. 11, 1976, 1080 U.N.T.S. 117. 
 41. Canada, for example, initiated BIT negotiations in 2008 with Tanzania, Madagascar, 
Indonesia, and other developing countries. See Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
Canada, Canada’s Foreign Investment and Protection Agreements (FIPAs), http://www. 
international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
 42. See Jason Webb Yackee, Conceputal Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bila-
teral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 458 (2008). 
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BIT.”43 Developing-country parties, in turn, have very limited, if any, 
negotiating power.44 Consequently, most of the provisions in a BIT are 
aligned with investors’ interests instead of the sovereignty of the devel-
oping country.45 Third, as will be discussed in Part II of this Article, the 
enforcement part of BITs is centered in the investor-state dispute settle-
ment provision, which allows investors to bring claims directly against a 
host country in an international arbitral tribunal in response to a violation 
of BIT obligations.46 Again, this mechanism mainly focuses on investors’ 
rights and nearly ignores investors’ obligations, thereby preserving the 
dominance of investment interests in developed countries.47 
Although the proposed International Trade Organization (“ITO”) faci-
litated negotiations on economic relations at Bretton Woods in 1944,48 
the United States Congress refused to ratify the ITO Charter in 1950, and 
the ITO was never established.49 Since the 1960s, when the BIT pheno-
menon began to develop steadily, international and multilateral forums 
have attempted to negotiate investment rules without much success.50 
The OECD, a collective of industrialized States, failed to regulate MNCs 
both during the 1960s51 and in 1998, when MAI negotiations were held.52 
In addition, the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations failed 
                                                                                                             
 43. E.g., U.S. Trade Representative, 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_up 
load_file847_6897.pdf [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model BIT]. 
 44. See Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and 
Its Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 953, 958 (2007). 
 45. Vandevelde, supra note 15, at 514 (discussing the investment liberalization effect 
of BITs). 
 46. See infra notes 265–75 and accompanying text. 
 47. See infra notes 288–90 and accompanying text. 
 48. The Bretton Woods Conference, held in July 1944, established multinational eco-
nomic institutions to govern international economic relations in the post-World War II 
era. In addition to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Bretton 
Woods negotiations discussed a proposed International Trade Organization to serve as 
the multilateral forum for trade negotiations. Bretton Woods Project, What Are the Bret-
ton Woods Institutions?, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/item.shtml?x=320747 (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 49. See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 80 (2d ed. 2008). 
 50. See Lowenfeld, supra note 24, at 123–25. 
 51. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967, O.E.C.D. No. 23081, 7 
I.L.M. 117 (1968). 
 52. See OECD, Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI), Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Draft Consolidated Text, OECD Doc. 
DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (Apr. 22, 1998), available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ 
ng/ng987r1e.pdf. 
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to agree on a code of conduct for MNCs,53 following several controver-
sial resolutions reflecting the adverse views of developed and developing 
countries.54 
In light of these failures, the OECD was probably not the appropriate 
forum for the development of an MAI. The breakdown of the negotia-
tions begs the question: which alternative forum would be more suitable 
for a renewed effort to create an MAI? The WTO has emerged as the 
best-suited existing forum, mainly because it has addressed several issues 
the OECD was ineffective in handling. First, the WTO has offered an 
open stage for developed and developing countries, and even welcomed 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”).55 Despite the harsh criticism 
directed at the WTO, it was and still is considered a diversified forum for 
international economic negotiations.56 It has facilitated an earnest North-
South discussion on investment issues.57 
Second, in the WTO forum, investment has not been examined as a 
stand-alone, but rather in the context of trade negotiations.58 As with oth-
er economic issues, a more cohesive approach towards international in-
vestment regulation has been adopted.59 As previously mentioned,60 the 
                                                                                                             
 53. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Transnat’l Corps., Inter-
governmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct, Work Related to the Formulation of 
a Code of Conduct, ¶ 22, U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/92 
(1981). 
 54. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974), for instance, did not 
receive any support from the industrialized countries. See Detlev F. Vagts, International 
Economic Law and the American Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 769, 
780 (2006) (describing how the “capital-exporting states” responded to developing coun-
tries’ expansion of nationalization rights with bilateral investment treaties programs, 
guarantees for their investors abroad, and threats to retaliate against expropriators). 
 55. According to Maura Blue Jeffords, writing in 2003, “More than 1,490 NGOs have 
had some interaction with the WTO[,] most of which are from Europe and North Ameri-
ca.” See Maura Blue Jeffords, Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The 
Need for Effective Consultation Between the WTO and NGOs, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937, 
951 (2003). 
 56. This diversity of interests can be perceived as a representation of “cosmopolitics” 
in the WTO. See Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
299 (2002). 
 57. See Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications 
for Future Negotiations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 285 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. South-
wick eds., 2002). 
 58. See, e.g., Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, ¶¶ 20–22. 
 59. See generally Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The 
Antinomies of the Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 731, 731–35 (1998). 
 60. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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strong linkage between trade and investment in the global economy has 
created a rationale for adopting international investment rules under the 
umbrella of a new, post-World War II international trade regime. Conse-
quently, and under the leadership of the United States, developed coun-
tries made several attempts to include investment rules in multilateral 
trade negotiations.61 Although efforts to incorporate comprehensive in-
vestment agreements in the Trade-Related Investment Measures Agree-
ment (“TRIMs”) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(“GATS”) have generally been unsuccessful, TRIMs and GATS do con-
tain a limited number of investment rules.62 Similarly, the Doha Round 
brought the investment regulation agenda to the trade negotiation fo-
rum.63 The “golden age” of multinational investment, together with re-
cent studies on the relationship between trends in investment and trade,64 
have helped integrate negotiations on investment regulations with the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration and with negotiations on a range of other 
issues.65 
Additionally, insofar as the Doha Round was declared the “develop-
ment round,” investment regulation, an area that influences sustainable 
development in a large number of markets, became a necessary part of 
the Doha agenda.66 The trade and investment working group became 
busier than ever; unfortunately, though, this did not last for long.67 
                                                                                                             
 61. See Lowenfeld, supra note 24, at 123–25. Despite several attempts to include 
investment rules under the GATT jurisdiction as part of the Havana Charter, the GATT 
did not include such rules. See LOWENFELD, supra note 36, at 103. Lowenfeld suggests 
that the failures of such attempts resulted in the GATT maintaining its stability and 
avoiding disagreements between East and West, South and North. See id. 
 62. See Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of 
a Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 100–40 (2003) (discussing investment rules 
in the GATS and the TRIMs under the WTO regime). 
 63. The Doha Ministerial Declaration explicitly included investment in its agenda. 
Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, ¶¶ 20–22. 
 64. For a detailed discussion of this linkage between trade and investment trends, see 
generally World Investment Report 2004, supra note 11; World Investment Report 2003, 
supra note 11. 
 65. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 66. On the Doha agenda as the “development round,” see Working Group on the 
Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Report (2002) to the General Council, 
WT/WGTI/6 (Dec. 9, 2002); Conference, Linking Trade and Sustainable Development, 
18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1271 (2003). 
 67. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy at the 
World Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 585, 602 (2001). 
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In a dramatic shift, investment, along with agriculture, became the 
deal-breakers of the Doha Round.68 Most commentators describe the ne-
gotiation of international investment regulation within trade forums as a 
battle between developed and developing countries on the critical issue 
of host-economy independence.69 The failure in Cancún suggests a more 
complex picture. Hence, I will now briefly consider the new dynamic 
that revealed itself at the Cancún Session, which ultimately obscured the 
investment agenda and its potential implications. 
First, the Cancún Session took place at a time when the political and 
economic power of some WTO Members—certain developing countries 
that have historically rejected MAIs—was on the rise.70 These States 
used their new political status to promote their interests, shifting the fo-
cus of the negotiations to the European and American subsidies of do-
mestic industries.71 Second, the proliferation of bilateral and regional 
trade and investment agreements discussed above72 has encouraged de-
veloping countries to participate in this trend and negotiate bilaterally 
and regionally, as their interests are less likely to be promoted on the 
multilateral level, given the clout of the G-22 countries.73 
Moreover, as the distinction between “free trade” and “fair trade” has 
grown dramatically in recent years, developing countries have been suc-
cessful in bringing real development concerns to the global arena.74 Yet, 
as trade negotiations became increasingly complex, requiring challenging 
adjustments by developing countries due to high levels of protective lo-
cal legislation, simply renewing the entire WTO agenda seemed over-
whelming; negotiation was thus restricted only to core traditional trade 
issues.75 
                                                                                                             
 68. Tequila Sunset in Cancún, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2003 (addressing the failure of 
the Cancún Summit in the context of the disagreements on the Singapore Issues). 
 69. See The Doha Round: The WTO Under Fire, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2003, at 26. 
 70. This mainly refers to the G-22 group, led by Brazil, China, and India, which in-
sisted upon ending negotiations over the Singapore Issues because of a lack of conces-
sions on agricultural subsidies and import barriers on agricultural products by the devel-
oped side. See Mario E. Carranza, MERCOSUR, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 
and the Future of the U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029, 
1052 (2004). 
 71. Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Talks Crash as Developing Nations Balk 
at ‘Singapore Issues,’ 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1533 (Sept. 18, 2003). 
 72. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 73. Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 71, at 1533. 
 74. Id. 
 75. In fact, the legal status of the Singapore Issues in the WTO was unclear from the 
beginning of the negotiations. See id. 
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II. THE NETWORK OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AS A DE 
FACTO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT 
A. Bilateral Agreements and the Need for Coordination 
I considered above the reasons for the Cancún Session negotiations’ 
failure, especially with respect to investment issues.76 Although the WTO 
forum is more transparent and diversified than the OECD, and notwith-
standing the fact that most disputes were resolved at the working-group 
level and through bilateral negotiations that produced numerous signed 
BITs, the delegations left Cancún without agreement on any issue, except 
perhaps the agreement to abandon investment regulation in the Doha 
Round.77 
As developing countries and other emerging markets used the negotia-
tions as a platform for again raising fundamental questions about distri-
butive justice in international economic agreements, the issue of interna-
tional investment regulation became a negotiation leveraging tool: the 
United States and Europe were willing to consider reductions in agricul-
tural subsidies in exchange for inaction on investment regulation.78 Thus, 
developed countries agreed to table investment regulation in order to 
keep alive the multilateral negotiations on trade.79 
Has the absence of multilateral action on investment regulation since 
the failure of the Doha Round encouraged countries to regulate invest-
ment unilaterally? Should it? Both questions can be answered in the neg-
ative. The pragmatic view, which was bolstered as a result of the Doha 
Round, holds that countries prefer to coordinate investment regulation on 
bilateral and regional levels.80 As aforementioned, there are currently 
more than 2200 BITs that have been executed, and many more are being 
                                                                                                             
 76. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Doha Work Programme, supra note 7, ¶ 1(g) (stating that the Singapore Is-
sues “will not form part of the Work Programme set out in . . . [the Doha Ministerial] 
Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues will take 
place within the WTO during the Doha Round”). 
 78. See Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 71, at 1533. 
 79. Id. 
 80. After the failure of the Cancún Session, even strong developed economies that 
have traditionally regulated foreign investment unilaterally expanded their efforts to ne-
gotiate many new BITs, the United States being a prime example. For a description of 
U.S. policy and a list of BITs signed by the United States, see Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Trade Compliance Center, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Sectors/Investment/ 
Section_Index.html [hereinafter List of U.S. BITs] (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). 
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negotiated.81 Moreover, even in the post-Cancún landscape, most argu-
ments proposing regulation of FDI through multinational coordination 
are compelling. Although home and host countries are traditionally seen 
as having conflicting interests, globalization arguments suggest that these 
interests are actually convergent to some extent, and recent economic 
theories have reinforced this perspective.82 For instance, broad invest-
ment protection not only limits the power of the host government; it ac-
tually serves to enhance the availability of credit and the liquidity of as-
sets in host markets.83 It is therefore in the host government’s interest to 
comply with wide investment protection. Accordingly, most BITs express 
the parties’ common goals in investment promotion and protection.84 
Second, whereas customary international law is regularly used to con-
strue investment protection provisions in expropriation cases, developed 
and developing countries have had diverging views on related questions, 
such as what kinds of investment a BIT should protect.85 Moreover, 
MFN and national treatment have evolved into the main rights of foreign 
investors under most BITs, whereas it is unclear whether these rights 
apply to pre- and post-establishment of an investment in the same man-
ner.86 Coordination on bilateral and regional levels, either through nego-
tiations or regional centralization of the treaty interpretation process, 
could provide answers to such questions and could help elucidate these 
thorny legal concepts. 
                                                                                                             
 81. See UNCTAD, Quantitative Data on BITs and DTTs, http://www.unctad.org/ 
Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=3150&lang=1 (last visited Jan. 16, 2009) (providing 
a chart and graph indicating that in 2002 there were 2181 BITs). 
 82. See Vandevelde, supra note 23, at 472–87. 
 83. See id. at 489–90. 
 84. See Calvin I. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign 
Direct Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 
30 (2005). 
 85. For example, as a result of North American Free Trade Agreement case law, a 
more limited definition of “investment” was recently adopted in the U.S.-Chile FTA, 
which includes investment provisions in Chapter 10. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, 
ch. 10, June 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 909, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html [hereinafter U.S-Chile FTA]. 
 86. While most host countries do provide those rights on a postestablishment basis, 
several countries have concluded BITs that provide the rights even before the investment 
has been established. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
assets/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Rwa/asset_upload_file743_14523.pdf; Treaty Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Oct. 25, 2004, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Uruguay/asset_upload_ 
file748_9005.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay BIT]. 
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Finally, the dispute settlement mechanism of investment agreements 
makes coordination on the bilateral level necessary. This mechanism al-
lows private investors, as individuals, to bring claims against host gov-
ernments before international arbitral tribunals based on alleged viola-
tions of a BIT.87 Without such provisions for dispute settlement, a BIT 
would represent merely an abstract declaration of the importance of FDI 
and its protection. The nonexistence of a forum for multilateral invest-
ment disputes underscores the fact that enforcement of investors’ rights 
under international rules is not viable without the consent of both parties 
to a bilateral dispute settlement mechanism.88 
It is essential, though, to understand that a State’s enthusiasm for con-
cluding bilateral agreements on the promotion and protection of interna-
tional investments will never supersede the State’s will to regulate cer-
tain domestic industries unilaterally. Thus, most countries maintain their 
security industries and relations with foreign markets, for example, 
through unilateral regulation or through separate mutual understand-
ings.89 
B. The Multilateral Aspect of Bilateralism   
At first glance, the bilateral dynamic previously discussed has little, if 
anything, to do with multilateralism. In fact, bilateralism has been suc-
cessful exactly where multilateralism has failed.90 Still, recent attempts to 
regulate investment have raised the possibility of a future MAI and have 
                                                                                                             
 87. See GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
246–57 (2004). 
 88. Id. at 250. 
 89. For example, Israel, a State under constant military threat, concludes BITs that 
exclude military and security industries from the wide protection of the treaties, including 
MFN and national treatment rights; Israel effects its policy regarding national security 
industries through bilateral security agreements and centralized local industry regulation. 
See, e.g., Security Memorandum of Agreement, U.S.-Isr., Oct. 31, 1998, available at 
http://www.aipac.org/Publications/SourceMaterialsU.S.IsraelBilateral/U.S._Israel_Securi
ty_memorandum.pdf. The centralized local defense industry is managed and supervised 
by SIBAT, the Israeli Defense Ministry’s defense assistance division. SIBAT, About 
Sibat, http://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/SibatMain/sibat/about/overview.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 
2009). For an overview of Israel’s investment policy, see Efraim Chalamish, An Oasis in 
the Desert: The Emergence of the Israeli Investment Treaties in the Global Economy 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript on file with Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 90. Cf. KATHERINE LYNCH, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CHALLENGES 
TO THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 145–58 (2003) (discussing 
the relative success of bilateralism through the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes). 
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reinforced the importance of investment regulation as a bargaining chip 
in international economic negotiations.91 
We shall now examine what I describe as the “multilateral” aspect of 
BITs. This concept has tremendous implications for the future of interna-
tional economic law. For example, it could foreclose the development of 
a multilateral agreement or render one redundant. Moreover, the multila-
teral dimension of bilateralism will enable arbitrators in investor-state 
disputes to turn to comparable BITs as interpretative tools. It will also 
justify the integration of corporate responsibility commitments into BITs, 
in response to potential arguments against integration based on the lack 
of a true MAI. 
1. The Substance of BITs and Regulatory Competition 
During the past century, political and economic movements have ad-
vanced through centralized structures, a national market in the United 
States, a Common Market in the European Union,92 and a “global mar-
ketplace.”93 These movements have relied upon the assumption that dif-
ferent standards for products or production processes can block market 
access for MNCs94 or constitute illegitimate comparative advantages95 
(i.e., externalities or strategic choices), and thus, impede economic inte-
gration. Harmonization is considered the remedy for another undesirable 
implication of FDI: a surge of foreign investment to low-standard juris-
dictions.96 Such a development, which would further loosen regulatory 
standards in many States, might create a so-called race to the bottom.97 
                                                                                                             
 91. See Kurtz, supra note 9, at 779–88. 
 92. The Common Market is the informal name for the European Economic Commu-
nity (“EEC”), which was established in 1958 following the EEC treaty, signed in 1957. 
The Common Market’s goal was to create an economic union, and subsequently a politi-
cal union, through united economic policies, such as liberalization of the movement of 
labor and capital. See generally Europa, SCADplus: Treaty Establishing the European 
Economy Community, http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 
2009). 
 93. See David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 759 (2000). 
 94. But see ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED 
GOODS AND MARKETS (1995) (contending that market pressures will produce an optimal 
degree of harmonization with respect to product standards). 
 95. Comparative advantages might be legitimate if diverging production standards 
were explained by different circumstances, such as geography or resources. Id. 
 96. See Alvin K. Klevorick, The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons 
from the World of Trade Policy, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 177 (1996) (discussing har-
monization as a potential solution for the race to the bottom problem). 
 97. For a description of this competition in the environmental law context, see 
DANIEL ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE (1994). 
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Notably, competition theorists are more open to government intervention 
and harmonization of international regulation in scenarios that exhibit 
externalities or other market failures than in scenarios that involve a race 
to the bottom,98 as the latter tend to produce inconsistent empirical re-
sults and involve controversial normative arguments.99 
Harmonization is not always a net-positive phenomenon. Regulatory 
competition theory is concerned with government failure created by 
harmonization and intervention, which can be more severe than market 
failure.100 Thus, regulatory competition can establish a market in loca-
tional rights, allowing MNCs to quit inefficient or high-cost countries.101 
Applying Tiebout’s classic model, competition among States provides an 
MNC decision-maker with a range of locational preferences reflecting 
different economic priorities.102 As a result, such competition also im-
proves social welfare and encourages governmental efficiency.103 
To assist legislators in regulating dissimilar legal regimes more effec-
tively, a number of scholars have developed models based on the advan-
tages of competition versus harmonization in international regulation.104 
Since governmental failures and market failures tend to exhibit different 
patterns in various legal disciplines, Professor Avi-Yonah, for example, 
has examined each discipline separately.105 He divides these disciplines 
based on two criteria: the consensus on the norms among States with a 
need for extraterritoriality, and the extent to which the MNC community 
supports or objects to the norms.106 The policy interests involved in ap-
plying extraterritorial regulations to MNCs—that is, comity or harmoni-
                                                                                                             
 98. For an introduction to the race to the bottom concept, see supra notes 96–97 and 
accompanying text. 
 99. See, e.g., WILLIAM BAUMOL & WALLACE OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 7–154 (1988) (addressing the theory of externalities as it relates to market regula-
tion). 
 100. Cf. Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regu-
lation, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 447–53 (2008) (introducing the concept of “regulatory 
competition theory” with respect to the regulation of global financial markets). 
 101. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416 (1956). 
 102. Cf. id. at 421 (describing a model for local, municipal expenditures, where, “[i]n 
so far as there are a number of communities with similar revenue and expenditure pat-
terns, the solution will approximate the ideal ‘market’ solution”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 20. 
 105. Avi-Yonah’s discussion of the applicability of national norms to international 
entities clarifies the modalities of using harmonization and competition approaches in 
international regulation. Id. at 8–13. 
 106. Id. at 10–13 (illustrating the interplay of these two factors using a matrix dia-
gram). 
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zation—should be determined using these criteria.107 Thus, when the 
MNC community cannot readily achieve the consensus voluntarily, mul-
tilateral legal tools should force similar norms. As mentioned above, the 
enforcement mechanisms of these legal tools are indispensable to the 
maintenance of a stable harmonization environment.108 
Bilateral treaties can play an important role in the evolution of interna-
tional legal harmonization. Sometimes, however, BITs can have a disrup-
tive effect, such as when regulatory competition results in a proliferation 
of bilateral agreements with a panoply of different arrangements, fru-
strating the realization of a truly harmonized regime.109 Such disruption 
is evident in international taxation, wherein harmful tax competition re-
duces tax rates and developing countries are forced to sacrifice tax reve-
nues in order to join bilateral double-taxation treaties.110 
Having considered the potential role of BITs in fostering harmoniza-
tion, we turn now to an examination of the specific competitiveness fac-
tor of BITs in shaping the international legal environment of FDI. Com-
petitiveness in this context refers to how investors use a BIT as a legal 
tool to determine their preference for one legal regime at the expense of 
another. Although there is an array of studies about how signing BITs 
affects future potential inflows of investments, such scholarship has not 
adequately considered various elements of the treaties and the treaty-
making process.111 
In short, the competitiveness factor of BITs is relatively insignificant. 
BITs differ based on two principal elements: the level of protection the 
host State affords to foreign investors, and the level of enforcement the 
host State undertakes.112 A host State can offer potential investors a more 
favorable investment environment by agreeing to a BIT that protects in-
vestors more extensively than other BITs. Including more investors un-
                                                                                                             
 107. Id. at 13–31. 
 108. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 109. For example, as discussed later in this Article, the MFN principle has various 
incarnations in different BITs, which create some confusion as to how this principle is to 
be applied in a specific set of circumstances. 
 110. See Tsilly Dagan, The Costs of International Tax Cooperation, in THE WELFARE 
STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 49–78 (Eyal Benvenisti & Georg 
Nolte eds., 2004) (analyzing the role of bilateral treaties in the complex scheme of inter-
national taxation). 
 111. See Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 39. 
 112. Investors’ protection is executed through the substantive rights of the treaty, 
mainly MFN, national, and fair and equitable treatment. The procedural rights of the 
treaty provide investors with the opportunity to enforce their direct claims against the 
host State in the event of any violation of substantive rights. See PETROCHILOS, supra 
note 87, at 246–57. 
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der the BIT’s protection, expanding the scope of protected investments, 
or granting more rights to investors can all help to provide broader pro-
tection. Yet, a close examination reveals that States do not actually use 
BITs to compete among themselves in investor protection. 
Most model BITs use similar definitions to identify the investors or in-
vestments covered by the treaty.113 When new financial instruments (e.g., 
derivatives) are recognized as a common tool of FDI, all BIT models 
typically incorporate them uniformly.114 Similarly, model BITs also af-
ford the same set of limited rights: MFN status, national treatment, fair 
and equitable treatment of investors, and compensation for expropriation 
based on the customary international law formula of “prompt, adequate, 
and effective compensation.”115 
In recent legal and economic literature, some have called for the inclu-
sion of investment incentive regulation within international legal agree-
ments.116 The need for incentive regulation comes from the race to the 
bottom theory, which suggests that competition for FDI among States, 
especially among developing countries, causes a degradation of labor, 
environmental, and human rights standards.117 Hence, a significant re-
duction in tax rates by a developing country to attract foreign investors 
might damage the public fisc of the host State, making tax coordination 
among developing countries an absolute necessity.118 Nevertheless, most 
BITs have not yet incorporated incentive regulation, and it would be an 
ambitious goal at the bilateral level, considering States’ reluctance to 
bear the costs of high-standard regulation.119 As long as BITs continue to 
follow current models, it is difficult to understand how BITs will facili-
tate lawmaking competition that would create new rights or obligations. 
                                                                                                             
 113. Most BITs include definitions of the following: “investment,” “investor,” “per-
son,” and “host State.” See Gabriel Bottini, Indirect Claims Under the ICSID Convention, 
29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 563, 618 (2008). 
 114. See, e.g., 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 43, art. 1 (including “futures, options, 
and other derivatives” in the definition of “investment”). 
 115. See, e.g., id. art. 6(1)(c). 
 116. See Japan Grows Positive on Bilateral Investment Treaties, JAPAN ECON. REV., 
Feb. 15, 2004, at 3 (proposing inclusion of investment-incentive regulation in Japanese 
investment treaties). 
 117. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining 
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 688 (1998) (con-
cluding, after a comprehensive analysis of the race to the bottom phenomenon, that the 
least developed countries should act as a group instead of competing against each other as 
individual States). 
 118. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis 
of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000). 
 119. See id. 
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In terms of dispute settlement, BITs could differ—and therefore com-
pete—by providing for various enforcement mechanisms, including the 
currently prevalent forum, the international arbitral tribunal. In theory, 
BITs could take divergent positions on core issues in investment arbitra-
tion, such as jurisdiction, privilege, confidentiality, and place of arbitra-
tion. Indeed, some model agreements already reflect such differences.120 
For the most part, however, BITs take very similar positions on dispute 
settlement questions.121 This can be explained by an international consen-
sus on dispute settlement norms, a proliferation of international agree-
ments accompanied by reciprocal influences, and attempts to create an 
international jurisprudence for international investment law, notwith-
standing that such jurisprudence is developed by numerous ad hoc inter-
national tribunals.122 This analysis reinforces the view that the substance 
of the treaties, along with their lack of differentiation and competitiveness, 
strengthens BITs’ role as an investment regulatory regime on a multila-
teral, not just a bilateral, level. 
2. The Signing Mechanism 
BITs have traditionally been negotiated between developed and devel-
oping countries, and this has an interesting impact on the design and 
signing mechanism of these treaties. It has been common for the devel-
oped country to require its developing-country counterpart to sign a BIT 
to protect its own investors’ interests as part of an attractive economic 
package,123 which usually includes other economic agreements that ap-
peal to the developing country.124 In view of the marginal economic im-
                                                                                                             
 120. For example, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT offers the possibility of a bilateral appel-
late mechanism. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 43, Annex D (“Within three years 
after the date of entry into force of this Treaty, the Parties shall consider whether to estab-
lish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered under 
Article 34 in arbitrations commenced after they establish the appellate body or similar 
mechanism.”). 
 121. See Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, 
and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 805 (2008). 
 122. For a discussion of the development of investor-state jurisprudence, see infra Part 
II.D. 
 123. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, United States, Uruguay Sign 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (Oct. 24, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_ 
Library/Press_Releases/2004/October/United_States,_Uruguay_Sign_Bilateral_Investment 
_Treaty.html (“U.S. BITs . . . ensure that U.S. investors are protected when they establish 
businesses in other countries.”). This U.S.-Uruguay BIT was the first to be concluded 
based on the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. Id. 
 124. These agreements can include double-taxation treaties, research and development 
treaties, and economic cooperation arrangements. See UNCTAD, Quantitative Data on 
322 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:2 
portance of some BITs, parties to such treaties use them mainly to en-
hance diplomatic relations.125 As a result, developing countries largely 
lack the ability to negotiate provisions of approved models, that is, mod-
els drafted and signed in advance by developed States.126 
Nowadays, intergovernmental institutions and international organiza-
tions play an important role in defining the need for BITs and in bringing 
parties to negotiate them. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (“UNCTAD”) and the World Bank, the main players in 
this field, actively initiate negotiations on BITs and then monitor the 
process from their inception to the signing stage.127 Both institutions en-
vision a desirable form for the BIT text and its implementation, and thus 
work towards a consistent policy in all stages of the negotiations.128 Al-
though they can recommend adjusting the text to the specific circums-
tances affecting the States involved, they tend to promote near-identical 
drafts. Therefore, they effectively function as centralized institutions that 
transform the network of BITs into a de facto multilateral agreement. 
Thus far, these institutions have yet to receive the appropriate mandate 
to promote an MAI.129 However, they can currently promote suprana-
                                                                                                             
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Treaties, http://www.unctad.org/Temp 
lates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=3150&lang=1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
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ment/Model_BIT/Section_Index.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). 
 127. See Gabriel Egli, Don’t Get Bit: Addressing ICSID’s Inconsistent Application of 
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1045, 
1058–59 (2007); UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements, http://www.unctad.org/ 
Templates/Startpage.asp?intItemID=2310&lang=1&mode=more (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). 
 128. In response to the Bangkok mandate, UNCTAD developed a special technical 
cooperation program that seeks to help developing countries in this respect. This program 
was adapted and expanded to reflect the needs of member countries in light of the Doha 
mandate, and subsequently implemented in close collaboration with the WTO. The Work 
Programme on International Investment Agreements principally encompasses policy 
research and human resources capacity-building, with a view towards consensus-
building. See UNCTAD, Progress Report on Work Undertaken on UNCTAD’s Work 
Programme on International Investment Agreement, 3–11, UNCTAD/ITE/Misc.58 (2002). 
 129. On the failure of the MAI, see supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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tional goals through the network of BITs.130 UNCTAD, for example, fa-
cilitates BITs primarily for the developing world, balancing the interests 
of MNCs with principles of international law such as sovereignty.131 
UNCTAD thereby furthers its mission to assure that the developing 
world receives its fair share in the economic benefits of globalization.132 
The World Bank also plays a key role in facilitating the enforcement of 
BITs by hosting a leading dispute settlement body, the International Cen-
tre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).133 The primary pur-
pose of the ICSID is to provide a forum for the conciliation and arbitra-
tion of international investment disputes.134 The World Bank offers loans 
to developing countries to encourage production and development, the-
reby fostering international investment by the private sector. Thus, in-
vestment protection is a natural and essential element of the World 
Bank’s agenda.135 
3. The Most-Favored-Nation Principle and Harmonization in BITs 
As we have seen, international investment agreements tend to contain 
similar provisions on rights and obligations as a result of the extensive 
involvement of international organizations such as UNCTAD, and the 
power dynamics of negotiations between developed and developing 
countries.136 In fact, BITs signed by countries from the same region that 
frequently experience similar macroeconomic conditions often share 
                                                                                                             
 130. The fact that UNCTAD is not as multilateral a forum as the WTO allows it to 
focus on bilateral and regional arrangements. See UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (2007) [herei-
nafter Investor-State Dispute Settlement]. The WTO, as a more comprehensive multila-
teral forum, may find engagement in bilateral or regional efforts more difficult due to its 
commitment to wide-reaching, multilateral goals. 
 131. See id. 
 132. UNCTAD, About UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItem 
ID=1530&lang=1 (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) (“[UNCTAD] promotes the development-
friendly integration of developing countries into the world economy. UNCTAD has pro-
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help shape current policy debates and thinking on development, with a particular focus on 
ensuring that domestic policies and international action are mutually supportive in bring-
ing about sustainable development.”). 
 133. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, About ICSID, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Show
Home&pageName=AboutICSID_Home (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). 
 134. Id. 
 135. In fact, in its early days, the World Bank mediated investment disputes as a neu-
tral party. See David Sedlak, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment Arbitra-
tion: Can the Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 147, 160 (2004). 
 136. See Chung, supra note 44, at 956–59. 
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identical texts.137 Moreover, developing countries’ new approach favor-
ing investment liberalization has reshaped their views on investment 
promotion and protection. This approach has led to the adoption of simi-
lar investment protection provisions and international law formulas, 
which stipulate the extent and type of compensation in the event of ex-
propriation.138 Next, I explore one such provision in investment agree-
ments—the MFN principle and its role in harmonizing international in-
vestment regulation. 
The MFN clause is one of the most salient provisions of investment 
protection agreements. Originally developed in trade agreements, the 
MFN principle prevents a host State from discriminating among different 
investors of different nationalities.139 Where a host country has signed a 
more favorable BIT with another country, an investor from a third coun-
try is entitled to an equal level of investment protection.140 
Since MFN treatment has become one of the most effective and popu-
lar legal tools for international investment protection, I examine the 
MFN case law of international arbitral tribunals as a law-harmonizing 
force. Recent case law in the international arbitration of investment 
agreement disputes, beginning with Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain,141 
highlights the attempt to harmonize investors’ rights and reaffirms the 
quasi-multilateral aspect of BITs. First, I analyze the Maffezini case and 
the reactions it provoked in the international economic law community, 
and then draw several conclusions about the future implications of the 
BIT regime. 
                                                                                                             
 137. See Nigel Blackaby, Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Treaties in Latin 
America, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 379, 387–412 (Nigel 
Blackaby ed., 2002) (examining commonalities among the BIT drafts of Latin American 
countries). 
 138. But see Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITS Really Work?: An 
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 67, 89–90 (2005) (noting that “the formulas used to determine compensation in re-
cent treaties vary from country to country”). 
 139. A typical MFN clause reads: “[e]ach Party shall accord to investors of the other 
Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors 
of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory . . . .” 2004 
U.S Model BIT, supra note 43, art. 4. 
 140. See LOWENFELD, supra note 36, at 397–403 (discussing the role of the MFN rule 
in international economic law as an element of BITs). 
 141. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/97/97 (Jan. 25, 
2000) (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction), available at http://icsid. 
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=
DC565_En&caseId=C163 [hereinafter Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction]. 
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On July 18, 1997, Emilio Agustín Maffezini, an Argentine investor and 
a national of the Argentine Republic, sent a request to the ICSID142 for 
arbitration against the Kingdom of Spain regarding his investment in an 
enterprise named EAMSA, which was to produce and distribute chemical 
products in the Spanish region of Galicia.143 Maffezini subscribed to  
seventy percent of the capital, while the Sociedad para el Desarrollo 
Industrial de Galicia (“SODIGA”), a Spanish entity, subscribed to the 
remaining thirty percent.144 Both Maffezini and SODIGA used private 
research to evaluate the project before investing in it.145 Nevertheless, 
roughly two years after the initial investment was made, EAMSA began 
experiencing financial difficulties, its construction stopped, and EAMSA’s 
employees were dismissed.146 Attempts were made to raise capital and to 
secure loans and subsidies in order to avoid financial failure, but most of 
these efforts were fruitless.147 
Consequently, Maffezini instituted an ICSID proceeding against the 
Spanish government.148 Maffezini based his claim on the provisions of 
the 1991 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of In-
vestment between the Kingdom of Spain and the Argentine Republic 
(“Argentina-Spain BIT”).149 I will now examine Maffezini’s arguments 
to understand his grounds for filing the ICSID claim. 
Maffezini alleged that the project failed because of SODIGA’s poor 
advice regarding the costs of the project, as the costs turned out to be 
significantly greater than predicted.150 Furthermore, according to Maffe-
zini, SODIGA forced EAMSA to start its operations before an environ-
mental impact assessment had cleared, causing EAMSA to incur addi-
tional unforeseen costs.151 Maffezini asserted that SODIGA is, in fact, a 
Spanish public entity, and thus, all of SODIGA’s acts and omissions are 
attributable to Spain, thereby allowing him to sue Spain in an interna-
tional arbitral tribunal under the Argentina-Spain BIT.152 
                                                                                                             
 142. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 143. Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶¶ 1, 65. 
 144. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/97/97 (Nov. 13, 
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?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC566_En&caseId=C163 [herei-
nafter Maffezini Award]. 
 145. Id. ¶¶ 40–41. 
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 148. Id. ¶¶ 43–44. 
 149. Id. ¶ 4; Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶ 1. 
 150. Maffezini Award, supra note 144, ¶ 44. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.; Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶ 72. 
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The ICSID tribunal sustained most of Maffezini’s claims, and on No-
vember 9, 2000, determined that the total amount of compensation, in-
cluding interest, Spain must pay Maffezini is about 58 million Spanish 
pesetas.153 However, the January 25, 2000, preliminary decision of the 
tribunal on objections to jurisdiction received much more attention in the 
international economic law community,154 and indeed, constitutes the 
heart of this Article’s discussion of the Maffezini case. 
Spain challenged the jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal and its compe-
tence, among other defensive arguments, on the ground that Maffezini 
failed to comply with the requirements of Article X of the Argentina-
Spain BIT, which deals with the exhaustion of domestic remedies.155 The 
Argentina-Spain BIT requires an eighteen-month waiting period before 
an investor can submit his or her claims to arbitration; during this period, 
domestic courts have the opportunity to dispose of a dispute.156 Maffezini 
submitted his claim before the expiration of this period.157 
While the tribunal found that Maffezini failed to comply with Article 
X of the Argentina-Spain BIT, this was not dispositive.158 Maffezini ar-
gued in the alternative that he has the right to rely on the MFN clause 
contained in the Argentina-Spain BIT.159 Like similar investment treaties, 
Article IV of the Argentina-Spain BIT states: “[i]n all matters subject to 
this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable than that ex-
tended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors 
of a third country.”160 Using the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT, 
Maffezini invoked the provisions of a 1991 BIT between the Republic of 
Chile and Spain (“Chile-Spain BIT”).161 Article 10(2) of the Chile-Spain 
BIT allows an investor to opt for arbitration after a six-month negotiations 
                                                                                                             
 153. Id. ¶¶ 35, 97. 
 154. See, e.g., Jürgen Kurtz, The Delicate Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treat-
ment to Foreign Investors: Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, in INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL 
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171, 181–84 (2008). 
 155. Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶ 19. 
 156. Id. (quoting Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments, Arg.-Spa., Oct. 3, 1991, art. X [hereinafter Argentina-Spain BIT]). 
 157. See id. ¶ 26 (“Claimant admits that the dispute was not referred to a Spanish court 
prior to its submission to the [ICSID].”). 
 158. Id. ¶¶ 36–37. 
 159. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. 
 160. Id. ¶ 38 (quoting Argentina-Spain BIT, supra note 156, art. IV(2)). 
 161. Id. ¶¶ 2, 39–40. 
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period has expired; it does not require an eighteen-month waiting pe-
riod.162 Maffezini claimed that as Chilean investors in Spain are treated 
more favorably than Argentine investors, the Argentina-Spain BIT 
should be construed as giving Maffezini the option to submit the dispute 
to arbitration without prior referral to domestic courts.163 
Spain rebutted Maffezini’s arguments. It contended that, under interna-
tional law principles, the MFN clause may only apply in respect to the 
same matter and may not be extended to matters different from those 
contemplated by the basic treaty.164 The MFN clause of the Argentina-
Spain BIT does not encompass questions of jurisdiction and other proce-
dural issues, unlike the material aspects of the treatment granted to inves-
tors, as discrimination cannot take place in connection with procedural 
matters.165 According to Spain, only if Maffezini showed that local courts 
in Spain are less favorable to the foreign investor than is ICSID arbitra-
tion would he be able to claim that the jurisdictional question has a ma-
terial effect on FDI treatment.166 
Discussing the application of the MFN clause to the BIT dispute set-
tlement mechanism, the Maffezini tribunal found that the clause did ap-
ply to procedural rights related to the mechanism, including jurisdictional 
rights.167 It based its decision on the language of the BIT, the policies 
that shaped the parties’ negotiation of the BIT, and the practice of the 
Spanish government in concluding its BITs.168 As a result, the tribunal 
held that Maffezini was entitled to the more favorable dispute settlement 
terms in the Chile-Spain BIT, permitting him to submit his claim to arbi-
tration after only six months.169 
The Maffezini tribunal extended dispute settlement provisions in other 
BITs without a clear reference in the MFN provision,170 since it found 
that the parties did not intend to omit this reference based on their treat-
ment of foreign investors as well as their own investors.171 However, the 
                                                                                                             
 162. Id. ¶ 39 (citing Agreement on the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of In-
vestments, Spa.-Chile, Oct. 2, 1991, art. 10(2)). 
 163. Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶ 40. 
 164. Id. ¶ 41. 
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 166. Id. ¶ 42. 
 167. Id. ¶ 64. 
 168. Id. ¶¶ 43–64. 
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Maffezini tribunal warned that investors should not “override public poli-
cy considerations that the contracting parties might have envisaged as 
fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the agreement in ques-
tion.”172 Among the various examples referenced are replacing the arbi-
tration forum chosen by the parties and exhausting local remedies.173 
I now analyze the tribunal’s decision and its importance to the creation 
of harmonization in international bilateral treaties. As mentioned above, 
foreign direct investors seeking to protect their investments have exten-
sively relied upon BITs’ MFN clauses in international arbitrations.174 The 
MFN clause, originally one of the most important principles in interna-
tional trade law, prevents a host State from discriminating among differ-
ent investors from different nationalities by allowing investors to claim 
more favorable protection terms granted to other investors by, inter alia, 
legislation, practice, or other BITs.175 
Therefore, an international arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of an MFN 
clause is enormously important in defining the coverage of investment 
protection under BITs. Moreover, since most of the MFN clauses in BITs 
are drafted using the same language, as previously noted,176 each deci-
sion related to the MFN clause has a powerful impact on the interpreta-
tion and drafting of many other BITs. While international arbitrators are 
not bound by previous decisions made by other international tribunals,177 
arbitral tribunals respect these decisions and integrate their reasoning 
into their own judgments and awards.178 
BITs also offer a limited number of investors’ rights, and these have 
been developed over the years by international economic law and prac-
tice and have been influenced by FDI trends.179 Accordingly, the MFN 
clause, which serves as the practical mechanism for investment protec-
tion, can be, in fact, a law-harmonizing tool.180 By forcing different 
                                                                                                             
 172. Id. ¶ 62. 
 173. See id. ¶ 63. 
 174. See LOWENFELD, supra note 36, at 397–403. 
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See, e.g., 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 43, art. 4. 
 176. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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Nation Clauses and Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 
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countries to converge on similar standards in international investment 
protection, the MFN clause, if widely applied, can increase the level of 
law-harmonization in the FDI realm.181 
Following the Maffezini decision, one would expect to see internation-
al arbitral tribunals explicitly adopting or rejecting its broad interpreta-
tion of the MFN clause. Adoption of the Maffezini approach, like the de-
cision itself, will signal the continued expansion and harmonization of 
protections for international investors against host States. Alternatively, 
highlighting the limitations of the Maffezini decision can suggest a bal-
ance between protection for international investors and the interests of 
host States. 
It appears that current ICSID jurisprudence is endorsing the Maffezini 
decision, further harmonizing international investors’ protections. In 
Siemens, A.G. v. Argentine Republic,182 another ICSID decision, the tri-
bunal followed Maffezini and concluded that it had jurisdiction over 
Siemens’ claims against Argentina, although the Germany-Argentina 
BIT required a waiting period of eighteen months.183 Like the claimant in 
Maffezini, Siemens invoked the MFN provision in this BIT to avoid wait-
ing eighteen months and submitted the claim directly to the ICSID, as the 
Argentina-Chile BIT does not contain such a requirement.184 The Sie-
mens tribunal was convinced that the dispute settlement mechanism—
access to ICSID arbitration—is among investors’ protections under the 
Germany-Argentina BIT.185 The Siemens decision also cites the policy 
restrictions expounded in Maffezini.186 
Two other cases have followed the Maffezini and Siemens rationale, al-
lowing investors from Luxembourg and Spain to immediately commence 
an ICSID arbitration against Argentina during the eighteen-month wait-
ing period required by the respective BITs.187 The tribunals in both cases, 
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Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic and Gas Natural SDG, 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, emphasized the notion that procedural arbi-
tration provisions in BITs are a significant substantive incentive and 
source of protection for foreign investors; thus, unless it appears that the 
parties agreed to another method of dispute resolution, the MFN prin-
ciple should be broadly construed to embrace dispute resolution provi-
sions.188 Camuzzi and Gas Natural reinforced the function that the MFN 
principle plays in the harmonization of international investment law. 
Nevertheless, recent negotiations over the Central America-Dominican 
Republic Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”)189 fascinatingly reveal 
the complex role of the Maffezini decision in international forums. The 
CAFTA-DR, based on the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”), aims to promote trade liberalization among the United 
States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and 
the Dominican Republic.190 This agreement is part of the current trend in 
international trade law: a proliferation of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements that contain a separate investment chapter.191 The U.S. gov-
ernment, for instance, has recently signed such agreements with Chile 
and Singapore.192 
The final draft of the CAFTA-DR sheds light on the parties’ ostensible 
intention to reject the Maffezini interpretation of the MFN clause. It lim-
its the reach of the MFN clause to matters “with respect to the establish-
ment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale 
or other disposition of investments,”193 excluding from the scope of the 
MFN clause procedural and jurisdictional questions related to the dispute 
resolution mechanism. In fact, a footnote in the CAFTA-DR draft expli-
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citly states that the MFN clause “does not encompass international dis-
pute resolution mechanisms such as those contained in Section C of this 
Chapter, and therefore could not reasonably lead to a conclusion similar 
to that of the Maffezini case.”194 The parties agreed to include this foot-
note in the “negotiation history” of the Agreement, even though the foot-
note was to be deleted from the final text.195 
The CAFTA-DR is a notable example of a regional trade and invest-
ment agreement that does not follow the legal language of many similar 
agreements on some significant issues in the investment protection chap-
ter.196 Among these variations are provisions for greater transparency in 
the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, and for an appeal me-
chanism for investor-state arbitration.197 It will be interesting to see 
whether the CAFTA-DR represents the beginning of a new trend, and 
whether future BITs will offer a variety of investment protection models, 
thereby increasing the competitiveness of the BIT as an international le-
gal instrument.198 Other arbitral tribunals might reject Maffezini, perhaps 
influenced by the CAFTA-DR approach199 as well as some host States’ 
criticism of Maffezini.200 If they do so, it might result in conflicting views 
on what qualifies as a case matter before a given tribunal. 
In fact, several recent ICSID decisions have explicitly criticized the 
Maffezini decision, expressing an unwillingness to extend the MFN 
clause to dispute settlement mechanisms and other procedural elements 
of investment protection treaties. However, a careful review of these de-
cisions suggests that they are exceptions to the general rationale of Maf-
fezini, giving effect to the public policy caveat raised by the Maffezini 
tribunal. In the recent case of Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Hashemite 
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Kingdom of Jordan,201 an ICSID tribunal considered an argument made 
by Salini, an Italian investor in Jordan, that the tribunal should have ju-
risdiction over contractual claims based on the MFN clause found in the 
Italy-Jordan BIT.202 Salini claimed that U.S. and U.K. investors in Jordan 
enjoyed a more favorable dispute settlement mechanism than did Salini, 
since the U.S.-Jordan and U.K.-Jordan BITs provide for ICSID jurisdic-
tion over contractual claims, whereas Article IX of the Italy-Jordan BIT 
sends contractual claims to local Jordanian courts.203 According to this 
argument, the MFN provision should offer Italian investors the same 
procedural treatment available to U.S. and U.K. nationals.204 
However, the tribunal concluded that the Italy-Jordan BIT cannot be 
applied to the dispute settlement process, and distinguished MFN provi-
sions that expressly include dispute settlement in their language from 
provisions that do not.205 The Salini tribunal was aware of the Maffezini 
caveat, which states that interpretations of MFN clauses should not 
overwhelm public policy concerns, such as honoring the intent of the 
parties that drafted the BIT or other existing principles of BIT interpreta-
tion.206 Nevertheless, the Salini tribunal was unconvinced that the public 
policy caveat of the Maffezini tribunal can prevent investors from ex-
ploiting varying MFN provisions by “treaty shopping,” as investors can 
operate in the country with the most favorable dispute settlement me-
chanism in its BIT.207 
Another recent ICSID case, Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of 
Bulgaria,208 followed the rationale of the Salini decision, asserting that 
“the MFN provision of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT cannot be interpreted as 
providing consent to submit a dispute under the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT to 
ICSID arbitration . . . .”209 In this case, Plama, a Cypriot investor, 
claimed that the MFN provision effectively permits replacement of the 
Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT’s dispute resolution mechanism—ad hoc interna-
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tional arbitration for compensation purposes only—with arbitration be-
fore the ICSID, as provided in the Bulgaria-Finland BIT.210 
The Plama tribunal pointed out that the circumstances in Maffezini 
were exceptional, as the Maffezini tribunal had to find a way to avoid 
applying a nonsensical provision requiring domestic remedies to be pur-
sued in local courts during the first eighteen months before the dispute 
could be submitted to the ICSID.211 The Plama tribunal criticized the 
Maffezini decision, along with two decisions that it considered to be in-
correctly based on Maffezini,212 for articulating a general rule and then 
qualifying it with multiple public policy exceptions.213 The Plama tri-
bunal recommended that the MFN provision be applied to the dispute 
settlement mechanism only when it is supported by the clear language of 
the BIT between the parties and their specific intent.214 A treaty’s histori-
cal context or any other parol evidence is insufficient to authorize a 
broader interpretation of an MFN provision.215 
Further, the Plama tribunal questioned the way the Maffezini tribunal 
treated the harmonization of international standards: “[it failed] to see 
how harmonization of dispute settlement provisions can be achieved by 
reliance on the MFN provision.”216 The tribunal described as “chaotic” 
and counterproductive to harmonization the phenomenon where an in-
vestor can use an MFN provision to cherry-pick a dispute settlement 
provision from one of the other BITs to which the host State is party.217 
According to this analysis, host States might find themselves exposed to 
several dispute settlement mechanisms to which they have not necessari-
ly agreed.218 
To summarize, some international arbitral decisions tend to follow the 
Maffezini wave, extending the MFN provision and harmonizing interna-
tional arbitration law standards,219 whereas a few others avoid this path, 
restricting MFN coverage of dispute resolution provisions to those cases 
where the parties’ intention to embrace this construction is made clear 
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through express language.220 While acknowledging these different ap-
proaches to interpreting BIT provisions, several scholars have pointed 
out that the general principles of Maffezini are still widely accepted when 
parties give their basic consent to ICSID jurisdiction.221 This lively de-
bate, which is taking place in several international arbitration forums,222 
reveals how the MFN clause can be used as a law-harmonizing tool in 
international investment arbitration. 
In this context, it is worth mentioning that commentators increasingly 
call for a more harmonized approach towards international arbitration, 
including its classical aspects such as advocacy.223 Arbitrators must be 
sensitive in the way they interpret rights and certain obligations, for their 
decisions contribute to the law of international investment arbitration.224 
In any case, embodying “multilateralist bilateralism,” Maffezini and other 
decisions that followed it demonstrate the impact of international in-
vestment arbitration case law on the harmonization of investment regula-
tion. 
C. The Need for a Future Multilateral Agreement: Implications 
To this day, multilateral forums have failed to develop a common ap-
proach towards an MAI. The United Nations, the OECD, and now the 
WTO have struggled to separate investment issues from the general dis-
cussion on North-South economic integration,225 leaving countries to ne-
gotiate investment treaties on bilateral and regional levels. Any discus-
sion on the prospects for a future MAI must take into account the fore-
going analysis of the multilateral aspect of BITs, and the fundamental 
questions that arise: is a multilateral agreement even necessary when one 
can identify an effective network of more than 2200 BITs? And even if 
                                                                                                             
 220. See, e.g., Salini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 201; Plama Decision on 
Jurisdiction, supra note 208. 
 221. See, e.g., Egli, supra note 127, at 1077–78 (addressing the inconsistency in apply-
ing the MFN provision in international investment law); Vesel, supra note 180, at 169–
81. 
 222. The ICSID is the leading institution where this discussion is occurring. 
 223. See R. Doak Bishop, Toward a Harmonized Approach to Advocacy in Interna-
tional Arbitration, in THE ART OF ADVOCACY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 451 (R. 
Doak Bishop ed., 2004). 
 224. For example, note the dialogue between the Siemens tribunal and the Maffezini 
tribunal. See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text. 
 225. Developed and developing countries have been negotiating several legal instru-
ments that aim to increase the exchange of investment and trade inflows in both, while 
advancing sustainable development in the latter’s economies, especially during the transi-
tion period of this integration. See generally Ostry, supra note 57, at 285. 
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an MAI is still found necessary, how will the BIT network impact the 
development and evolution of an MAI? 
Several commentators have called for the establishment of a World In-
vestment Organization226 to serve as a platform for multilateral negotia-
tions on investment issues, and as an enforcement forum similar to the 
Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) of the WTO.227 Avi-Yonah argues, for 
example, that the only suitable forum to discuss serious international  
investment dilemmas is a multilateral one where both developed and de-
veloping countries have legitimate representation.228 Both UNCTAD and 
the OECD suffer from a substantial bias towards various interest groups.229 
Although the WTO could have been an appropriate forum, linking trade 
and investment would undermine the credibility of the WTO negotiation 
process as the principal forum for world trade issues, as well as the 
DSB.230 The proposed World Investment Organization would benefit 
from a narrower mission. 
The development of the BIT network supports such an argument. As 
discussed above, BITs grant investors limited rights that focus mainly on 
antidiscrimination and compensation in the event of expropriation.231 The 
enforcers of BITs—international arbitral tribunals—can help promote 
investment liberalization without becoming implicated in distinct inter-
national economic principles such as trade.232 A future multilateral in-
                                                                                                             
 226. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, 
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Heiskanen eds., 2001). 
 231. See Vandevelde, supra note 15, at 506–14. 
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see Todd Weiler & Thomas W. Wälde, Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter 
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vestment forum, which would adopt such a disciplined approach to in-
vestment regulation and enforcement, is more likely to produce an MAI 
with the support of both investors and host States.233 While NGOs con-
sistently fight against multilateral economic forums that seem to be dom-
inated by industrialized countries or Western capitalist interests,234 the 
case of the extensive and evenly spread BIT network demonstrates an 
acceptable legal framework. 
However, given the relatively harmonious character of this network, 
the added value of a future MAI to the process of refining an internation-
al investment regulatory framework remains an open question. Although 
any potential MAI will not necessarily threaten the BIT network, the li-
mited, additional value of an MAI may not justify the utilization of pre-
cious resources and the foreseeable annulment or adaptation of existing 
bilateral treaties. The preservation of the current BIT network helps sus-
tain the fine balance among the interests of multiple parties and reflects a 
consensus in state practice. 
A multilateral agreement under the umbrella of a putative World In-
vestment Organization would monitor States’ compliance with invest-
ment regulation more effectively.235 Similarly, a permanent investment 
tribunal would promote consistency in investment jurisprudence, offering 
a comprehensive, cohesive interpretation of the MAI, thereby preventing 
conflicting decisions by a multitude of investment tribunals.236 When a 
State faces a financial crisis that has a significant impact on several indus-
tries and many companies, numerous claims are concurrently submitted 
to numerous investor-state tribunals, but raise similar legal questions.237 
                                                                                                             
 233. Cf. Kurtz, supra note 9, at 779–88 (suggesting a similar model for a future multi-
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Such scenarios can result in multiple inefficient decisions,238 inconsistent 
findings on similar financial facts, and a lack of political power to en-
force these decisions separately. For instance, following the financial 
crisis in Argentina in 2001, investors simultaneously brought their claims 
against Argentina to the ICSID and other tribunals, pursuant to the rele-
vant provisions in the BITs between Argentina and investors’ home 
States.239 The separate cases repeatedly scrutinized the same 2001 Argen-
tine legislation enacted after the currency crisis in the local market.240 
A consolidation of claims arising from the same financial crisis or sim-
ilar pattern of state behavior will help arbitrators gain a better under-
standing of the crisis or state conduct, its scope and implications, in addi-
tion to saving time and litigation costs. The decisions of investor-state 
arbitral tribunals in consolidated cases will have a stronger political pow-
er, which is still needed to enforce the award against the host govern-
ment, despite the legally binding effect of arbitral judgments.241 In inter-
national law, it is generally difficult to enforce awards and other obliga-
tions against governments, and investor-state arbitration provides a use-
ful illustration.242 Argentina, for example, constantly ignored internation-
al obligations, such as repaying International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) 
                                                                                                             
 238. Compare, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/01/12 
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loans, though the loan agreements were absolutely valid.243 Although 
governments have, for the most part, respected the arbitral awards of in-
ternational investor-state tribunals, this practice could change dramatical-
ly due to many governments’ growing protectionism and their increasing 
lack of trust in international tribunals.244 Of course, a consolidated proce-
dure should not prevent the tribunal from granting different awards to 
different investors, based on variation in the extent of damages suffered. 
Moreover, if an MAI is ultimately unfeasible, the structural problem dis-
cussed above—multiple, fragmented arbitrations arising from common 
events—should be avoided through the negotiation and drafting of future 
BITs.245 The class action common in U.S. civil procedure might be a 
helpful model in this context as well.246 
Not every aspect of investment regulation can be analyzed solely on 
the bilateral level. Where unilateral or bilateral investment regulations 
have externalities and impact other countries, there is a need for coordi-
nation through multilateral agreement. For this reason, most commenta-
tors believe that multilateral agreements will regulate international anti-
trust or international tax in a more effective way.247 
Of course, bilateral agreements do have distinct advantages for their 
signatories, which should be considered in the negotiation of future mul-
tilateral agreements. Bilateral forums can allow parties to tailor models 
to their own needs. Common variations include, inter alia: protective 
conditions on foreign investment before it is accepted by the host State 
(the pre-admission model) versus protective conditions only after it has 
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been accepted by the host State (the post-admission model);248 exclusion 
of certain investors or industries from protection under the treaty; or even 
the inclusion of dispute settlement mechanisms that emulate certain legal 
traditions, usually those of the home country. For example, as a result of 
Israel’s security policy, which prevents foreign investors with hostile 
motives from entering the Israeli market, its model BIT bars foreign in-
vestors from State A who control entities in State B from bringing inves-
tor-state claims against Israel under a BIT between State B and State 
C.249 Similarly, France excludes foreign investors from obtaining control-
ling ownership in the French film industry in order to protect French he-
gemony over its culture.250 Recent U.S. BIT negotiations raised the pos-
sibility of including an appellate procedure in investor-state dispute set-
tlement, in response to internal political pressures to pursue such an ob-
jective.251 Although some of these variations can be accommodated 
through restrictions in and reservations to a future MAI, most of them are 
essentially bilateral in nature, and therefore cannot be integrated into a 
multilateral instrument. 
Moreover, negotiations on multilateral agreements tend to be con-
ducted by political blocks that share common interests.252 The interests 
are definitely not identical, though. Disagreements among some devel-
oped countries during the negotiations on an MAI at the OECD in 1998 
illustrate variation within what seemed at the time to be a homogeneous 
group.253 While the multilateral dynamic empowers unified groups and 
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fosters international concessions, it can never completely address the 
needs of individual States within the blocks. Bilateral agreements can 
better reflect the unique interests of the various parties. In addition, en-
forcement mechanisms between States can sometimes be more effective, 
as the parties usually negotiate economic agreements on a repetitive ba-
sis.254 
In sum, the current BIT movement maintains a unique, sensitive status 
quo between home and host States and serves as a de facto MAI. The 
BIT network can be a reliable long-term solution, while an MAI is un-
likely to be signed in the near future. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, 
the implementation of BITs is fraught with several structural problems, 
including the inconsistent interpretation of treaty language and a multip-
licity of arbitral decisions on similar fact patterns, and lacks a strong in-
stitutional element. Thus, the international community should act to es-
tablish a World Investment Organization to develop, execute, and moni-
tor an MAI based on a credible, legal, and diplomatic consensus, and 
supported by the BIT network. 
An intermediate solution is for BITs to be supervised by a multination-
al organization that includes a permanent arbitral or judicial tribunal255 
and for all BITs to then select this institution to handle monitoring and 
dispute settlement. In the absence of a multilateral agreement, States pre-
fer to keep the jurisdictional issue to themselves as part of their bilateral 
negotiation power, which makes such an arrangement unfeasible. How-
ever, most BITs already choose the ICSID as their arbitration tribunal, 
and UNCTAD functions as the main monitoring authority for BITs;256 
thus, the intermediate regime is already, albeit informally, in action.257 
The vital role that the ICSID mechanism plays in investment treaties and 
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investment arbitration jurisprudence supports the view that the ICSID 
can become a leading forum in a centralized BIT-monitoring process.258 
D. The Establishment of Investor-State Arbitration Jurisprudence 
Over the past decades, investment arbitration has become one of the 
most prominent developments in international law. A strong recognition 
of nonstate actors, along with the need to make individual rights enforce-
able, have advanced the use of the investor-state dispute settlement me-
chanism.259 This mechanism allows private investors to sue States directly 
in international arbitral tribunals under BITs concluded between home 
and host States for violations of their rights.260 Alternative dispute resolu-
tion has flourished in international commerce, with investor-state arbitra-
tion existing as an integral part of this wave.261 While the new paradigm 
accepts investors or private companies as coequal newcomers to the in-
ternational law community, the general principles of international arbi-
tration, such as the requirement that the parties consent to the arbitration 
procedure, are still observed.262 
I have thus far identified the multilateral aspect of the BIT network and 
made the case for de facto multilateral regulation through this network.263 
Insofar as traditional international law draws a distinction between treaty 
law and customary law,264 this novel concept of a de facto multilateral 
agreement suggests that bilateral treaties are evolving into customary 
international law due to their multilateral character. Given the absence of 
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a de jure MAI, it is difficult to argue that comprehensive customary in-
ternational law on investment would have otherwise developed. As illu-
strated below, this fact has a tremendous effect on the progression of in-
vestor-state arbitration jurisprudence. 
The concept of investment multilateralism allows arbitral tribunals to 
interpret similar terms or provisions in different BITs in the same man-
ner. This is true both for provisions setting forth substantive rights as 
well as for procedural provisions.265 Indeed, despite the fact that arbitra-
tors are not obligated to follow other investment tribunals’ awards as 
precedents, they increasingly follow substantive and procedural trends in 
investment arbitration, and are influenced by the notions of investment 
liberalization and international economic law’s general code of con-
duct.266 In addition, recent BITs, including the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, 
have increased multilateral governmental intervention in this interpreta-
tion process.267 
Furthermore, obligations that are widespread throughout the BIT net-
work can be used as a regulatory framework even when no such frame-
work exists. As Andreas Lowenfeld has demonstrated, arbitrators may 
use the general BIT framework as a source of law when there is no BIT 
signed between the investor’s home State and the host State, provided 
that the host country has signed other BITs or has become a party to an 
investor-state arbitration convention, like the Washington Convention.268 
The fact that BITs do not include a concrete set of international arbitra-
tion law rules supports this view.269 Even if the host State has not signed 
such bilateral treaties or conventions, the framework can still apply, pro-
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vided that the State has never rejected the principles embodied in the BIT 
network.270 From this point of view, legal obligations that have been ac-
cepted by a large number of States for a long period of time will become 
part of customary international economic law and fill the multilateral 
regulation gap.271 However, it is important to note that the BIT frame-
work cannot be used as a source of regulation when the host country has 
not given its consent to the particular arbitration procedure.272 In keeping 
with the fact that arbitrators can and do use other BITs as a source of 
substantive legal obligations and look to awards given by other arbitral 
tribunals interpreting a variety of BITs, what substantive and procedural 
trends can be identified? 
When an investor-state arbitral tribunal examines the status of an in-
vestment, it must balance between the competing interests of investment 
protection and the legislative power of the host country. This is especial-
ly true when it comes to a host country’s need to protect domestic indus-
tries and promote national economic welfare. Arbitrators consistently 
feel the political tension between the obligation to comply with the BIT’s 
goals, on the one hand, and the interest in maintaining the host State’s 
acceptance of the tribunal’s procedure and decision, on the other.273 A 
tribunal’s efforts to remain within the scope of its jurisdiction based on 
the BIT’s language are crucial to the success of the process, especially 
given the need for state consent to both jurisdiction and enforcement.274 
Consequently, arbitrators consider the multilateral effect of their deci-
sions in order to preserve credibility in future claims brought by inves-
tors before the same or other tribunals.275 
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Reviewing recent developments in investment arbitration law indicates 
that while tribunals do not provide investors with easy recoveries for un-
sound investments, investment tribunals have broadly interpreted proce-
dural provisions in order to expand jurisdiction.276 Additionally, in terms 
of substantive law, the tribunal in Mondev International Ltd. v. United 
States recognized the need to protect investors beyond the minimum 
standards of customary international law, following the trend of higher 
standards expressed in the BIT network.277 In the Mondev case, the mul-
tilateral consensus caused the tribunal to suggest a higher level of protec-
tion.278 
Arbitral tribunals have loosened many procedural requirements that 
factor into jurisdictional issues in order to allow more investors to bring 
claims, as discussed below. The multilateral consensus among interna-
tional arbitral tribunals has shifted the sensitive balance between the need 
to protect investors and the need to preserve state sovereignty towards a 
more investor-friendly regime. In Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. 
v. Argentine Republic, for example, the ICSID tribunal found that ac-
cording to international law, actions of a political subdivision of a State 
are attributable to the central government, regardless of the State’s con-
stitutional structure.279 This decision granted foreign investors standing 
for a claim against Argentina.280 The Compañía de Aguas tribunal fol-
lowed the long-standing international principle of state responsibility and 
broadened the jurisdictional umbrella of the BIT.281 Moreover, it decided 
that the claim could be heard even though the dispute had already been 
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brought to the national courts; the claims were not barred under collateral 
estoppel because the BIT did not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the national courts.282 As discussed earlier in the Maffezini case, the tri-
bunal eased the exhaustion requirement, determining that the Argentina-
Spain BIT, which calls for exhaustion of Spanish domestic remedies be-
fore submitting a claim to an arbitral tribunal, was inconsistent with the 
understanding of exhaustion under international law.283 
The Mihaly International Corp. v. Sri Lanka decision permitted an 
American company to proceed with its claim despite its partnership with 
a Canadian entity that was not covered by the scope of the tribunal’s ju-
risdiction.284 Finally, the Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka A.S. v. Slova-
kia case recognized the possibility of bringing a claim based on continu-
ing state behavior that commenced before the treaty entered into force, 
even if the BIT’s jurisdiction is explicitly based only on behavior that 
started after the treaty went into effect.285 In this case, it was unclear if 
the Slovak Republic’s behavior followed the BIT’s entry into force, so 
the tribunal based its jurisdiction on an older BIT that had been incorpo-
rated by reference into an agreement between the parties.286 
III. INTEGRATING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY INTO THE BIT NETWORK  
Thus far, this Article has examined how the BIT network has evolved 
as a “de facto” multilateral agreement, or as customary international eco-
nomic law. This evolution has provided broader protection to foreign 
investors and, therefore, has led us to question the very necessity of a 
future MAI.287 However, developing countries and NGOs that have con-
sistently objected to the multilateral negotiation of investment regulation 
without provisions on corporate responsibility are certainly unsatisfied 
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with this temporary solution.288 Indeed, drafts of BITs only include in-
vestors’ rights, while their responsibilities as nonstate actors in the inter-
national community are conspicuously absent,289 a situation that may be 
traced to several factors. The inability to strike the fine balance between 
corporate rights and responsibilities has repeatedly led to failures in ne-
gotiations on an MAI.290 
All BIT models follow this structure and have been well respected due 
to their limited objectives to promote and protect foreign investment 
based on acceptable international law principles.291 Integrating corporate 
responsibilities into BITs has not been considered desirable under these 
circumstances. As a result of an industrialized country’s dominant posi-
tion during the negotiation of a BIT, a developing country cannot nego-
tiate the inclusion of provisions on corporate responsibility. Therefore, 
only collective action will allow developing countries to negotiate regu-
lation of corporate responsibilities. Is the BIT network as a multilateral 
framework appropriate for such an endeavor? The answer appears to be 
positive. I now examine this proposition and suggest different ways of 
integrating corporate responsibilities into existing and future bilateral 
treaties. 
A discussion of the potential integration of corporate responsibilities 
into the BIT network should be able to answer three core questions: First, 
despite failure on the multilateral level, is the BIT network the appropri-
ate forum for institutionalizing corporate responsibility? Second, what 
responsibilities should be included in the BIT network? Third, what kind 
of enforcement mechanism, if any, should the BIT network adopt with 
regard to corporate responsibility? 
While in the extensive scholarship on corporate responsibility there is 
debate over what MNCs should be accountable for292 and how accounta-
bility can be instituted and enforced, there is also a strong normative 
voice in favor of MNCs’ accountability for violations of human rights 
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 289. See Sol Picciotto, Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Busi-
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and labor standards under international law.293 Since MNCs play an im-
portant role in the modern State, executing governmental functions either 
as business partners or government agents, or through outsourcing mis-
sions,294 the line between state and nonstate actions is increasingly vague. 
Several commentators have made the case for applying international hu-
man rights and international labor law obligations to MNCs and other 
nonstate actors, particularly when a corporation cooperates with local 
governments or performs governmental functions.295 Indeed, even when 
the host State only serves as a platform for private investment activities 
without jointly participating in the foreign investment or delegating go-
vernmental functions, some international legal instruments impose direct 
obligations on MNCs.296 
While imposing such obligations on States has raised many objec-
tions,297 regulation of foreign-investor responsibilities seems to be an 
easier case. First, developing countries are worried about harmonizing 
human rights and labor law, as they are afraid of losing their sovereignty 
and ability to implement local policies.298 When it comes to foreign in-
vestors, intervention in local policies is less effective, especially as 
MNCs can be regulated by standards other than those of the host State. If 
such standards are enforced only against foreign investors in a particular 
country, it might well reduce foreign investment in that country, or even 
provide for a discrimination claim.299 
Furthermore, the international community has traditionally punished 
States that violate human rights and labor laws through trade sanctions 
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imposed by other States.300 These sanctions reduce the welfare of both 
States (i.e., home and host) and, in many cases, are ineffective, which 
tends to undermine the legitimacy of trade sanctions.301 Thus, Arie 
Reich, among other scholars, has called for promoting multilateral legal 
instruments and international cooperation in order to enforce internation-
al standards in a manner that raises fewer objections by the international 
community than do unilateral sanctions.302 The enforcement of corporate 
responsibilities in the sphere of international investment law is a desira-
ble policy objective that should garner more of a consensus. Core inter-
national standards accepted by the majority of States would be imposed 
extraterritorially on MNCs actively involved in human rights or labor 
law violations, and only on these MNCs.303 
An MAI, developed either within the OECD or by WTO mandate, 
could be a proper venue for a binding codification of corporate responsi-
bility provisions on four different levels: the MAI could express com-
mitment to promoting investment in a way that is fully compatible with 
human rights obligations,304 ensure that implementation does not inter-
fere with the protection of human rights,305 include human rights organi-
zations among its constituency,306 and lastly, provide enforcement me-
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chanisms to deal with human rights violations. The MAI could thereby 
gain wider political support from developing countries and the NGO 
community, which would enhance the legitimacy of the agreement. Ad-
ditionally, States would likely accept regulation based on the NAFTA 
model to prevent a race to the bottom dynamic according to which com-
petition for foreign investment would lower social standards.307 
Yet, when several attempts were made to conclude an MAI, the devel-
oping world and the NGO community strongly objected to what, at the 
time, was called the “Charter of Multinational Corporations,” an agree-
ment that aimed to serve the interests of the international business com-
munity and the industrialized countries.308 This opposition, together with 
disagreements among developed States,309 led to the systematic failure of 
the negotiations, leaving the world with merely general, nonbinding dec-
larations on corporate responsibility.310 
MNCs have encountered consistent criticism of their corporate practic-
es in developing countries since the early 1990s, which has pushed many 
to adopt corporate codes of conduct.311 These codes are developed and 
exercised on a voluntary basis, with the strong participation of other non-
state actors, and usually concentrate on core labor norms universally rec-
ognized by the international community.312 While some of these “codes” 
are general in nature, most are specific, covering particular corporations, 
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industries, or specific geographical areas, and as a result, they differ from 
each other in terms of substance, structure, and spirit.313 
Such methods of self-regulation suffer from some significant disadvan-
tages. First, an impartial international body does not monitor compliance 
with the codes,314 and third-party auditing mechanisms have often been 
recognized as corruptive measures.315 Secondly, corporate codes of con-
duct do not include an international enforcement mechanism of any kind, 
which often causes them to look merely like a public relations tool.316 
The International Labor Organization (“ILO”) has been considered inef-
fective for the very same reason: it lacks enforcement powers.317 Fur-
thermore, the codes’ diversity and the consistent objections they receive 
from business interest groups make the chances of adopting the codes on 
an international level and with legally binding effect very slim indeed. 
Therefore, human rights activists, with support from various legal cir-
cles, have adopted a mixed-tools strategy: soft law regulation of corpo-
rate practices accompanied by hard law regulation, mainly through U.S. 
and European tort law, the enforcement of which has brought several 
high-profile MNCs to trial.318 In addition, media campaigns and consum-
er boycotts have led to several changes in corporate behavior.319 Legal 
scholars should continue to seek international regulation of corporate 
responsibility that is binding and enforceable. 
The BIT network, conceptualized as a de facto multilateral agreement, 
provides a unique opportunity to establish, for the first time, an interna-
tional enforcement mechanism of corporate responsibilities recognized 
by participating MNCs. Whereas traditional international law provides 
state-to-state dispute mechanisms based on the principle of mutual con-
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sent, the modern investor-state arbitration mechanism allows MNCs to 
bring claims against States in international arbitral tribunals for viola-
tions of their rights and to seek compensation for damages.320 A mechan-
ism that already allows nonstate actors such as MNCs to sue host States 
directly should be normatively justified in imposing responsibilities on 
the same MNCs, and, where appropriate, finding them accountable for 
human rights violations. Modern international law recognizes the need to 
grant nonstate actors rights and responsibilities, based on international 
economic law and international human rights law, and supplemented by 
individuals’ right to be compensated for their damages.321 
Along the same lines, individuals who suffer damages as a result of 
MNCs’ violations of corporate responsibilities recognized by both the 
home and host countries under the BIT will be able to bring claims di-
rectly against them before an arbitral tribunal. The plaintiff would give 
his or her consent to the procedure by submitting the claim to the tribun-
al, while the investor would manifest consent by bringing a counterclaim 
against a State pursuant to a BIT. 
An investor entitled to sue the host State in an investor-state tribunal 
should be aware of the exposure, in the same proceeding, to a claim 
based on a breach of corporate responsibilities. However, this mechan-
ism should not be limited to a “clean hands” requirement322 in an inves-
tor-state arbitration procedure, or even to claims brought against an in-
vestor only after the investor brought an investment claim under the BIT. 
BITs should explicitly state the jurisdictional ambit of such corporate 
responsibility claims. The scope of the corporate responsibility protec-
tion (i.e., a “clean hands” requirement, counterclaims asserted against 
investors bringing affirmative claims on the BIT, or independent claims 
against corporations) will be determined based on support from corpora-
tions, governments, and the legal community. 
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In addition, the latest trend, establishing corporate codes of conduct, 
demonstrates the importance of involving the companies in the very 
process of asserting claims for breaches of corporate responsibility. It 
was the concept of consent, along with the limited scope of the treaty, 
that earned the investor-state arbitration mechanism of BITs wide sup-
port among both the investment community and host States. In the same 
way, only core responsibilities that reflect international human rights and 
labor law principles, principles broadly recognized by the international 
community and MNCs, are likely to receive the support necessary to in-
clude them in future treaties. 
As discussed above, several self-adopted corporate codes of conduct 
provide MNCs with certification of good behavior based on monitoring 
reviews, allowing them to insulate themselves against possible claims of 
bad practices.323 These codes can be annexed to existing BITs to reflect 
the norms on which future claims may be based.324 Associating BITs 
with certain corporate codes of conduct will also help investment arbitra-
tors determine which international corporate responsibilities should be 
applied in a particular case, in light of the large number of international 
nonlegally binding instruments. The recognition of the BIT network as a 
de facto multilateral agreement could transform the bilateral mechanism 
for FDI into a multilateral enforcement mechanism for corporate respon-
sibilities. It will be fascinating to follow such jurisprudence as it evolves 
based on classical investor-state arbitration. 
Several potential drawbacks should be addressed, though. First, inves-
tor-state arbitral tribunals have traditionally been comprised of experts in 
international economic law.325 It is necessary to include experts in inter-
national human rights law and international labor rights law to adjudicate 
future claims against MNCs. NGOs and other international organizations 
with relevant expertise can be part of the process, either during the tri-
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bunal selection or during the hearings, duplicating the NAFTA model of 
labor and environment side agreements.326 
Second, the process of integrating corporate responsibility provisions 
into investment treaties and implementing them is likely to be time con-
suming and sui generis.327 Resultantly, it will be daunting to achieve 
harmonization of corporate responsibilities through the investor-state 
dispute mechanism. As previously noted, multiple inefficient decisions 
may result due to tribunals’ inconsistent interpretations of similar fact 
patterns, and a lack of political power to enforce each decision separate-
ly. Such a challenging path is inevitable, but worthwhile, as an enforce-
ment mechanism for international corporate responsibility would be a 
seminal achievement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Cancún Session and the diplomatic negotiations that followed it 
herald the temporary disappearance of investment regulation in the mul-
tilateral trade forum. While the prospects for renegotiating a multilateral 
agreement in the near future are limited, the existing network of BITs 
can serve as an effective multilateral framework for investment regula-
tion. Evolving beyond traditional concepts of international law, BITs can 
create a multilateral base through their unique MFN principle, signing 
patterns, and parallel content and concepts. 
This innovative notion of multilateral bilateralism offers much more 
than a temporary solution for proponents of harmonization in interna-
tional investment regulation. It affords arbitrators of investor-state cases 
a treaty interpretation tool, regulatory framework, and point of reference 
for BIT jurisprudence. While investment treaties have developed sporad-
ically on the bilateral level for more than four decades, recent develop-
ments in international economic law call for a new multilateral regime. 
The current regime empowers foreign investors politically, legally, and 
economically, perpetuating inequality between developed and develop-
ing countries. Developing countries, which have thus far been extremely 
reluctant to negotiate a multilateral agreement on investment, find them-
selves confronting a new bilateral regime that reflects their concessions 
on investment protection and limits their own sovereign, legislative pow-
er. 
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Looking ahead, and acknowledging that this new regime is unlikely to 
soon disappear, developing countries have a valuable opportunity to in-
tegrate corporate responsibilities into the current and future network of 
BITs. Since existing BITs are typically concluded for limited terms, 
many of them will be up for renewal in the coming years.328 The inves-
tor-state arbitration mechanism constitutes a credible forum in which to 
balance investors’ rights with their own corporate responsibilities. Arbi-
tral tribunals will be able to hold MNCs accountable and compensate 
individual victims for violations of corporate responsibilities; in turn, 
tribunals will award investors compensation for discrimination or expro-
priation by host States. The BIT network should go far beyond a general 
declaration of corporate responsibilities, or even a “clean hands” re-
quirement for investment claims: it should bring about a new era of tri-
bunals empowered not only to bring justice to investors, but also to bring 
investors to justice. The failures of the Doha Round can paradoxically 
spawn groundbreaking progress in international investment law based on 
the BIT network. 
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